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The investigation, arrest, and conviction of a number of high-profile hacker-activists, or 
hacktivists, reveal the ways subjectivity is mobilized through processes of revelation and 
evasion. We use the term subjectivation to describe the performative practices engaged 
in by hacktivists and contrast them with governmental and disciplinary practices of 
subjection. We elaborate upon two categories of subjectivation (coming out and 
versioning) and two categories of subjection (doxing and gagging). These categories 
form the vectors of hacktivist and state coproduction that emerge in selfie-incrimination. 
We use the term selfie to describe both intentional and inadvertent practices of online 
self-disclosure. Selfie-incrimination that is public and voluntary we discuss in terms of 
coming out. Versioning describes the public voluntary manipulation of personal identity. 
Being doxed entails the online disclosure of a hacktivist’s identity. Gagging refers to this 
ultimate silencing of illicit political digital activity, wherein the state designates the 
parameters of speech as well as physical movement. We conclude by examining the 
entangled and asymmetrical relationship between hacktivist subjectivity and the 
cybersecurity of the state.  
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Subjectivation and Hacktivism 
 
Hackers are a distinct community who enjoy tinkering with computers and software, such as the 
German-based hacker organization Chaos Computer Club (Kubitschko, 2015) and the global open source 
movement (Kelty, 2008). These groups form a community around the sharing of best practices, 
knowledge, and software. The term hacking describes a varied set of practices involving a range of legal 
and also illegal acts. Hacktivists are individuals who use computers and networks to achieve political 
objectives. Ludlow (2013, p. 4) emphasizes advanced technological proficiency and political agency when 
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he defines hacktivists as actors who use “technology hacking to effect social change.” Their efforts include 
Internet Relay Chat discussions, distributed denial of service attacks, the production of propaganda 
videos, and the proliferation or mirroring of censored content (Fish, 2016). In this article, we focus on 
hacktivists who exfiltrate and publish information concerning the illegal or unethical activities of private 
companies or governments, which are sometimes called cracking (Jordan & Taylor, 2004, pp. 4, 17) or 
enforced transparency.  
 
We describe the investigation, arrest, and conviction of a number of high-profile hacktivists. We 
focus on the powerful evidentiary role given to social media–derived personal data in these cases and 
analyze some of the adaptations and negotiations this engenders in hacktivist praxis. Today on social 
media sites, whether as a criminal, an activist, or an innocuous citizen—and regardless of whether they 
use encryption and pseudonyms—many people produce and leave a digital trail connecting to identities, 
preferences, political affiliations, and physical locations. If they are engaged in illegal activity, this 
evidence can be used against them in a court of law. 
 
In light of the ubiquity of online personal data and its evidentiary power, we examine the chain of 
action that begins with the information management of hacktivist identity, its performative and practice-
oriented disclosure, its eventual unmasking by investigators or rivals, and finally, the hactivist’s bodily 
capture and internment by state actors. Our focus is on the self-directed and self-forming versions of 
subjectivity engendered by social media platforms. We adopt the term subjectivation to describe these 
performative practices engaged in by hacktivists and contrast them with governmental and disciplinary 
practices of subjection (Althusser, 1971; Butler, 2002; Foucault, 2002; Kelly, 2009). 
 
Our understanding of subjectivation draws on Goffman’s (1959, 1963) work on the performativity 
of public life and the patterns of concealment and disclosure linked to the management of a discredited or 
discreditable identity, as well as Foucault’s (2002) emphasis on the active, agent-directed constitution of 
the subject. In contrast, we use subjection (Althusser, 1971) to refer to the broader process of 
subordination and subject creation that emerges in relation to dominating institutions of power. 
Subjectivation is central to the notion of performative politics and the sort of ethical skepticism of 
established power and knowledge relations Foucault associated with an Enlightenment critique (Butler, 
2002, pp. 217–218; Foucault, 2002). In this context, subjectivation signifies practices of self-
transformation that emerge in response to the obligations imposed by governments and their demands for 
unquestioning obedience. We understand hacktivism in similar politico-ethical terms, as a critical 
interrogation of state discourses of truth, the mechanisms of power they are bundled with, and the 
technologies of subordination they further. As a direct challenge to the technologies of the self pursued 
through governmentality and discipline, hacktivism can be understood as an “art of not being governed” 
(Foucault, 2002, p. 192).2 
                                                 
2 Much has been made about how social media requires self-presentation (Goffman, 1959) and how 
modernity enhances the self-reflexivity (Giddens, 1991), or fluidity (Bauman, 2000), of daily life. Previous 
scholars have analyzed social media in terms first advanced by these scholars. For instance, Goffman’s 
work has been used in the study of online “impression management” (Picone, 2015); Giddens’s ideas have 
been used to connect reflexivity to digital democracy (Nothhaft, 2016); and Foucault’s notion of discipline 
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  Social roles—whether raced, classed, or gendered—are performed through routinized and public 
actions. Reflexivity is a central component of performative theory because it shapes how individuals learn 
to adopt different social positions. In contrast, hacker cultures, and digital cultures more generally, 
espouse a distinctive view of identity. Instead of a static and fixed persona, online culture encourages a 
performative skepticism (Butler, 1997) about the links between the online and off-line self. In the digital 
world, much like in postmodern linguistics, the signifier—one’s profile picture, for instance—does not 
always correlate with what is signified—oneself (Derrida, 1978), and the differences between what is real 
and what is virtual can be exaggerated, understated, or subverted. Indeed it is precisely this hyperreality 
(Baudrillard, 1994) that forms the context within which the spectrum from transparency to anonymity 
exists.  
 
In this sense, hacker identity is pliable, performative, and fluid, but this flexibility is premised on 
the ability to be, and remain, anonymous. These online performances are uncoupled from the “dramatic” 
and staged setting that usually comes with an off-line “audience” (Goffman, 1959, pp. 30–34), providing a 
space within which hacktivists can be whoever they claim to be. Yet the discrepancy, or gap, between 
these shifting “virtual” identities and the “actual” off-line social identity an individual possesses (i.e., the 
collection of attributes, characteristics, and signifiers that make the individual a socially distinguishable 
person) inevitably generates tension. It invites the deployment of information management techniques 
and patterns of revelation and concealment to manage the potential stigma of discovery and the “spoiling” 
of social identity (Goffman, 1963, pp. 12, 57, 164).3  
 
Despite this tension, within the liminality of online performances, the literal technologies of 
selfhood—online platforms that afford virtuality, pseudonyms, and multiple identities—create the 
conditions for a pluralized and agential subjectivation. For example, the sort of “identity subsumation” 
(Sauter, 2014, p. 81) involved in joining Anonymous actions entails the temporary coming together of 
numerous, individual personalities under the mantle of the Anonymous meta-identity, a performance that 
is supported and reinforced by, among other things, the adoption of shared pseudonyms and “improper 
names” used by multiple participants (Deseriis, 2012). These practices multiply the reach of an 
                                                                                                                                                 
and Baumann’s idea of liquidity have been used to critique online surveillance (Baumann & Lyon, 2013; 
Fuchs, 2013). 
3 A point of clarification is necessary here. In drawing on Goffman’s work Stigma (1963), we have felt it 
necessary to update some of his categories for the digital age. The distinction between “virtual” and 
“actual” social identity is an obvious example. In Goffman’s terms, “virtual” referred to the sort of 
impressions people draw about a person that they know little about. He contrasted this with “actual” social 
identity, which involved the sort of attributes and characteristics that an individual could be proved to 
possess and embody. In Goffman’s analysis, then, the implication is that the latter is more “real,” or more 
authentic, than the former. We do not make any claims of this sort; indeed, we follow the general 
direction of online scholarship, which argues that online, or “virtual,” identities can be, in some respects, 
more real or authentic than their off-line counterparts precisely because in becoming free of those 
attributes, characteristics, and markers that define a person as “that kind of person,” individuals are free 
to explore and develop identity in ways that more closely correspond to their inner preferences. 
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individual’s actions and expand his or her performative repertoire while also blurring the lines between the 
swarming crowd and the individual (Sauter, 2014, p. 82).  
 
Hacktivists engage in antagonistic, political, and often illegal work. As an “art of voluntary 
insubordination” (Foucault, 2002, p. 194), hacktivism targets power and questions its discourses of truth. 
This insubordination also inflects the form, content, and public perception of hacktivist dissent. Activists 
eschew the conventional normative and moral expectations publics have come to associate with traditional 
forms of protest or civil disobedience (e.g., the civil rights movement). Instead, groups like Anonymous 
cultivate an “outlaw persona” (Sauter, 2014, pp. 92–93), through which the valid political content of their 
message is rendered morally and politically “impure” (Shelby, 2015) by the unconventional form (e.g., 
profane, illegal, violent, offensive, pornographic, etc.) it takes. This not only invalidates the legitimate 
political character of the action but it also reinforces the association between this mode of activism and 
criminality. In short, hacktivist subjectivation does not happen in a vacuum and is not theirs alone to 
construct; rather, it emerges in a set of dialectical and coproduced interactions involving online 
communities, off-line publics, governmental institutions, and law enforcement authorities. For the latter 
groups, hackers represent a significant threat to the social order: They disrupt the long association 
between disciplinary technologies, punishment, and subjectivity (Thomas, 2003, pp. 180–181).  
 
Hacking is made possible by the separation of body and identity in a virtual setting. For example, 
when one hacks into another’s account or uses a stolen password, one is effectively performing that 
person’s identity through the use of secret (or personal) authentication designed to confirm the current 
user is the genuine article (Thomas, 2003, p. 187). The investigation, prosecution, and conviction of 
hackers work to reconnect these virtual personas to the bodies and corresponding off-line social identities 
that theoretically own them. In this sense, the hacker’s pursuit by law enforcement authorities becomes 
an occasion for the “reconstitution” of both hacker and subject (Thomas, 2003, pp. 185–186). 
 
In seeking to hold hackers accountable, the state and its various apparatuses of hard and soft 
power condense these multiple “virtual” identities into one imprintable and imprisonable person (Butler, 
1997, 2002; Foucault, 2002; Kelly, 2009). Indeed when rival hackers or law enforcement dox hacktivists 
or when they “come out” on their own volition, authorities begin a process of singularization designed to 
reinscribe the unmasked persona within state-derived categories and markers of social identity.  
 
Thus, on the one hand, the goal of a criminal investigation is practical: It seeks to reconnect 
virtual identities with their embodied counterparts so that suspects can be named in investigative and 
court documents, can be physically located and surveilled, and can ultimately be held behind prison walls, 
in digital exile. On the other hand, however, this reconstruction of “actual” social identity is a process that 
sets the stage for the conversion of a discreditable person (one who obfuscates or systematically 
frustrates the disjuncture between virtual and actual off-line identity) into a discredited person (Goffman, 
1963). It furthers media narratives and public anxieties concerning the current intersection of technology 
and identity as well as the dangers posed by anonymity and the dark recesses of the Web. State practices 
of stigmatization and degradation—as well as the application of labels like criminal, terrorist, or felon to 
hacktivists (Goffman, 1963)—feed into these anxieties and supplement these narratives. Ultimately, these 
are as much transformational practices (Garfinkel, 1956) aimed at the subjugation of the self as they are 
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exercises of symbolic power directed at the public (Bourdieu, 1994). We adopt the term subjection 
(Althusser, 1971, pp. 133–181) to describe these official efforts in singularization and stabilization.  
 
In the sections that follow, we describe the investigation, arrest, and conviction of a number of 
high profile hacker-activists, or hacktivists. We elaborate on two categories of subjectivation (coming out 
and versioning) and two categories of subjection (doxing and gagging). These categories form the vectors 
of hacktivist and state coproduction that emerge in selfie-incrimination (see Figure 1). We use the term 
selfie to describe both intentional and inadvertent practices of online self-disclosure. We discuss selfie-
incrimination that is public and voluntary in terms of coming out. Versioning describes the public voluntary 
manipulation of private identity. Being doxed entails the online disclosure of a hacktivist’s real-world 
identity. Gagging refers to this ultimate silencing of illicit political digital activity, wherein the state 
designates the very parameters of speech as well as physical movement. We conclude by examining the 
entangled and asymmetrical relationship between hacktivists and the state.4  
 
  Public Private 
Involuntary 
(Subjection) 
Outed; doxed Gagging; imprisonment 
Voluntary 
(Subjectivation) 
Coming out; whistleblower Anonymity; versioning (public voluntary 
manipulation of private identity) 
 
Figure 1. The Selfie-Incrimination Complex.5 
 
 
Selfie-Incrimination and Versioning 
 
We use the term selfie in a manner distinct from the way in which it is commonly used. While 
some analysts pathologize this mode of self-expressivity as narcissistic (Keen, 2015) and others 
understand it as a form of empowerment (Nemer & Freeman, 2014), we use it as an umbrella term that 
designates all the artifacts that result from the convergence of social media, online performances, and 
criminal prosecutions. We therefore perceive this axiomatic and ubiquitous mode of contemporary self-
                                                 
4 In collecting data for this project, we used a mixed methodology that combined the examination of 
primary documents and interviews with alleged hacktivists, lawyers, and criminal investigators. We sought 
to collect data about the techniques used by both hacktivists and criminal investigators. To this end, we 
read and examined all available court documents for Silk Road founder Ross Ulbricht, whistleblower 
Chelsea Manning, hacker Andrew Auernheimer, and Anonymous associates Barrett Brown, Jeremy 
Hammond, Matt DeHart, Lauri Love, and Hector Xavier Montsegur. We also examined primary documents 
produced by Edward Snowden and Julian Assange. 
5 While our analysis reinforces a public-private divide, we believe the boundary between them is less fixed 
than often assumed. Social media makes the boundaries separating the public and the private less 
stringent. 
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expression through the lens of law enforcement and national security experts, who see a wealth of 
criminal evidence in social media (Risen & Poitras, 2014). For example, a 2012 poll of U.S. law 
enforcement agents found that 80% searched online for information about suspects (Zadrozny, 2012, 
para. 13). New York Times investigative reporter Ian Urbina writes, “[S]ocial media has been a boon for 
law enforcement, handing the police ready admissions of guilt, equipping criminal investigators with new 
types of evidence and empowering prosecutors to better dispel reasonable doubt of guilt (2014, para. 1).. 
 
Our argument is that much like others in the “self(ie) generation” (Blow, 2014)—socially liberal, 
digitally literate 18–33-year-olds—hacktivists are quintessential networked selves, whose identity is built 
up around online performances, playful uses of networks, and competencies with digitally derived 
vernaculars. The persistence, scalability, replicability, and searchability of social media make it difficult to 
erase personal information (boyd, 2010). Hacktivists use social media as a platform for the performance 
of their activist selves, and in the process often provide the very digital breadcrumbs that lead to criminal 
investigations. The present digital culture centered around the pervasive collection of volitional and 
amateur content by corporate and government bodies is personified in the concept of the selfie—a political 
as well as an economic system of self-surveillance. 
 
Selfie describes both intentional and inadvertent practices of online self-disclosure. While self-
representation with images, video, and social media has become a quintessential form of self-expression 
and identity performance, it poses a paradox for the hacktivist who uses computers, networks, email, and 
social media to acquire and disseminate political information. With every selfie comes a risk of self-
incrimination, or selfie-incrimination. Higinio O. Ochoa, a member of Cabincr3w (which is associated with 
Anonymous and Lulzsec), who was charged with hacking and releasing Arizona police officers’ addresses 
and phone numbers, is a case in point. In April 2012, Ochao posted a tweet linking to these police 
documents under the name @Anonw0rmer. Associated with the tweet was an image of Ochoa’s girlfriend’s 
breasts above a sign bragging, “PwNd by w0rmer & CabinCr3w <3 u BiTch’s !” (Diaz, 2012, p. 3). The 
iPhone picture contained geolocatable metadata that led to further evidence and his arrest. While few 
activists are brazen enough to post an actual selfie, hacktivists find it difficult to not selfie-incriminate.  
 
In the context of this predicament, hacktivists and their pursuers use an assortment of “virtual” 
identities to obfuscate the links between their online and off-line identities (Brunton & Nissenbaum, 2015). 
In an effort to elude selfie-incrimination, they seed misinformation through the practice of versioning. In 
the software industry, versioning refers to the process by which a new iteration of software acquires a new 
categorical identity. For example, the read-write Web 2.0 is seen as an incremental improvement version 
over the read-only Web 1.0. Versioning signifies the “bootstrapping,” or processual nature, of startup and 
software culture, wherein developers are encouraged to release software early and update it often. Like 
multiple identity performativity, another software version is not entirely new. Rather, it is the core product 
with different features. We introduce the concept of versioning as a way to describe the unstable, flexible, 
and performative character of hacktivist identities online.  
  
Anonymity, pseudoanonymity, privacy, and secrecy (while not guaranteed by even the most 
robust cryptography) are pursued in online spaces that do not have “real name” policies such as 
Facebook. Within these spaces a single hacker might adopt numerous screen names—in short, different 
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versions of him- or herself connected with immediate practical tasks. For example, the hacktivist Jeremy 
Hammond went by a series of aliases—“Anarchaos,” “sup_g,” “burn,” “yohoho,” “POW,” “tylerknowsthis,” 
“crediblethreat,” “ghost,” “anarhacker,” “O”—on Internet Relay Chat (IRC) channels while discussing 
ongoing hacks and planning new operations (U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York, 
2012). This also means that versioning requires significant interpretive work: Hactivist discussions take 
place among individuals who may have never met face-to-face, guard their off-line personas, and deploy 
multiple versions of themselves contemporaneously. Interlocutors must be capable of tracing the 
continuities between these different hacktivist iterations so that they can have a reasonable sense of 
“who” they are talking to or, at the very least, whether they are law enforcement. 
 
The pliability and flexibility of the networked self means that law enforcement can also practice 
versioning. During his investigation of the Silk Road market, Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) 
agent Jared Der-Yeghiayan acquired access to some 18 user accounts (U.S. District Court for the Southern 
District of New York, 2015, pp. 693–694). In addition to the 6 accounts he created on the forums and on 
the market, Der-Yeghiayan commandeered 12 accounts through the coerced consent or arrest of previous 
owners. Early into the investigation, he took over the account “cirrus” from a low-level site administrator 
(U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, 2015, pp. 691–692). Posing as “cirrus,” he 
became a trusted insider and worked his way up the ranks into the Silk Road’s managerial circle (U.S. 
District Court for the Southern District of New York, 2015, p. 728). 
 
Similarly, HSI agent Carl Force worked undercover for over a year, befriending convicted Silk 
Road “mastermind” Ross Ulbricht (aka Dread Pirate Roberts [DPR]) and becoming his off-line enforcer. In 
addition to his covert work, Force created a series of unauthorized, virtual personas to communicate with 
DPR. With one of these he attempted to extort $250,000 from Ulbricht in exchange for not providing 
incriminating information to law enforcement (U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California, 
2015, p. 3). He also arranged a fake murder for DPR, under the moniker “Nob,” and was paid $100,000 by 
Ulbricht as “French Maid.” As “Death From Above” he told DPR that he was a Green Beret and friend of the 
man allegedly killed by “Nob,” who was going to kill Ulbricht (Greenberg, 2015). Although seemingly 
empowered by the performativity of the networked self and its capacity for anonymity, Force—much like 
the hacktivists discussed previously—was the victim of his own selfie-incrimination (he was recently 
sentenced to 6.5 years for bitcoin money laundering and wire fraud associated with the Silk Road 
investigation). 
 
Versioning lays bare the process-oriented, performative nature of hacktivist online identities. It 
targets the strategies of self-presentation, identity management, and “face work” (Goffman, 1959, 1967) 
that dominate actor performances in the off-line world. In contrast, social media platforms like Facebook 
and Google+ seek to extend these interaction structures: They use processes of replication, correlation, 
and indexing to chart an actor’s off-line associations so that they can be directly ported into digital form. 
Though the end product is more scalable, nuanced, and actor directed, the effect is to reify and confirm a 
singular “actual” social identity that is already categorically fixed in the off-line world.  
 
The manifold nature of identity performances challenge any static perspectives on subjectivation. 
Versioning is an exercise in agential self-creation that exploits the pseudo-anonymous affordances of 
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social media and provides a space for the performance of multiple, virtual selves. Versioning is also a 
practice performed by the state, whose identity deceptions embolden investigators in virtual worlds. Once 
there, a process of corralling and cross-referencing unfolds whereby the winnowing of pseudonyms, 
biographical fragments, and personal characteristics may eventually lead to the linking of online and off-
line identities. In an unexpected about-face, aliases designed to evade self-incrimination become 




Some hacktivists willingly disclose their identities while in pursuit of information they find 
germane to the public interest. Whether they label their actions as investigative journalism or 
whistleblowing, the rationale for self-exposure flows from the motivation to bring to light the illicit, illegal, 
or unethical practices committed by governments or corporate institutions. At times, self-identification is 
an inevitable part of the process of information liberation since information about the data’s provenance is 
necessary to legitimate and authenticate it, but at other times the decision to cross the threshold between 
off-line and online social identity is deliberate and calculated.  
 
Understood in the context of the impression management and information control strategies 
(Goffman, 1963) deployed by actors to negotiate the “discrepancy between virtual and actual identities 
that when made known or apparent spoils his social identity and discredits him,” voluntary disclosure can 
appear as a strategic moral and political turning point (Goffman, 1963, pp. 31, 125). Earlier we drew on 
the concept of “impure dissent” (Sauter, 2014; Shelby, 2015) to illustrate the point that hacktivist political 
communication is rendered morally and politically illegitimate because of the unconventional form it takes 
or the content with which it comes bundled. A central characteristic that helps render the motives of 
hacktivists morally and politically suspect (besides its illegal or controversial facets) is the use of 
anonymity. Indeed as Sauter (2014, pp. 90–92) has argued, Anonymous activism brings to the fore the 
extent to which assigning a politically responsible motive to dissent is predicated on the Western 
expectation that if critique and civil disobedience are to be labeled legitimate, they must be performed 
through a state-sanctioned and socially transparent identity. Coming out involves reclaiming political 
responsibility and legitimacy through self-disclosure and revelation. It is an attempt to shape social 
identity in the court of media or public opinion and outside the stigmatizing narratives of the state. 
 
The mainstream media play an important role in manifesting hacktivists’ goals of bringing 
attention to political causes. For some, coming out is a necessary component of gathering media 
attention. Take Julian Assange, for instance. Largely because of the way journalists have framed the story, 
it is now difficult to differentiate between Wikileaks and Assange’s persona. A brief exchange in the 
documentary We Steal Secrets (2013) provides a glimpse into the paradoxes generated by the spotlight. 
While a Swedish makeup artist applies bronzer to his face, the videographer Mark Davis asks a question 
that illustrates the tension between Assange’s publicity and the operation’s secrecy: “WikiLeaks needs a 
face?” To which Assange responds,  
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Yeah, well, the public demands that it has a face. And actually we’d much prefer—I’d 
prefer —that it didn’t have a face. We tried to do that for a while and people just, the 
demands were so great people just started inventing faces. (We Steal Secrets, 2013)   
 
Assange describes his notoriety as a kind of martyrdom—“It is my role to be the lightening rod to 
attract the attacks against the organization for our work” (We Steal Secrets, 2013)—and it is clear that 
this increased visibility has been double-edged. He is wanted for extradition by Swedish authorities and 
remains under siege at the Ecuadorian embassy in London, where he has sought refuge for over three 
years. On the other hand, by giving the organization a prominent mouthpiece and spokesperson, Assange 
is able to articulate a coherent ethical frame to recast the work of Wikileaks as an act of political 
dissidence, protest, and critique. 
 
Like Assange, Edward Snowden, the whistleblower of the NSA’s secret, unwarranted, and bulk 
surveillance programs, decided to come out. In May 2013, Laura Poitras filmed Snowden watching world 
events from a room in Hong Kong’s Mira Hotel as the Washington Post and Guardian began reporting on 
the leaked material. Poitras assumed that he would want to remain anonymous but Snowden had long 
planned to out himself: “I will be identified, and my footprint will be left once the documents are 
published, and the government will know” (Ehrlich, 2014, p. 5); he also knew that his footprint would 
guard against anyone questioning the authenticity of the material (O’Hehir, 2014).  
 
He eventually agreed to being filmed and told Poitras, “I hope you will paint a target on my back 
and tell the world I did this on my own” (Harding, 2014, p. 37). The target painted by Poitras (a short 
video released by the Guardian) shows a reflexive young man motivated by a sense of public duty: He 
blew the whistle to prompt a sustained public debate about the otherwise private and illegal actions 
conducted by the United States and its allies. In contrast to the celebrity and scandal swirling around 
Assange, Snowden’s eloquent recasting of his actions under the banner of democratic constitutionalism 
seemingly increased his credibility and the significance of his actions. 
 
The Justice Department response was predictably swift and severe: Snowden is wanted for 
extradition and has been charged under the 1917 Espionage Act for communicating national-defense 
information without authorization and for revealing classified information (Finn & Horwitz, 2013). 
President Obama’s adviser on Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, Lisa Monaco, invited Snowden to 
“come home to the United States, and be judged by a jury of his peers” (White House, 2015, p. 5). Like 
all whistleblowing, coming out involves accepting the consequences of one’s decision. Indeed Snowden 
has repeatedly sought a plea deal involving jail time from U.S. authorities as long as he is not cast as “a 
deterrent to people trying to do the right thing in difficult situations” (Graham, 2015, p. 2).  
 
Assange and Snowden illustrate the extent to which subjectivation and subjection are co-
created—as well as the competing discourses of truth unleashed by whistleblowing. Hacktivists claim that 
their actions have a critical purpose and an ethical motivation. At the same time, the state simultaneously 
claims that their actions reveal who they really are (i.e., criminals, terrorists, spies) and the danger they 
pose to the body politic. 
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Another individual who came out is Barrett Brown, a freelance journalist who had written for 
Vanity Fair, The Huffington Post, Business Week, and The Guardian. He had been affiliated with 
Anonymous for a number of years and first logged into the AnonOps server using his real name when 
Operation Tunisia (in support of pro-democratic activists) began—in the process, violating the core 
precepts of anonymity and radical equality that animated the community. Discussing this moment in an 
IRC chat a short time later, Brown wrote: “I have been Anon for five, six years, came out two months ago. 
I have got a plan” (U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas, 2014, p. 46). In the period that 
followed, Brown invited publicity, offering himself as a mouthpiece for Anonymous and speaking openly to 
reporters, penning press releases, and posting videos of himself online. Ironically, it was an interview he 
gave with Russia Today during an ongoing Anonymous operation (in retaliation for the takedown of the 
site MegaUpload by U.S. authorities) that first brought him to the attention of Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) agents (U.S. District Court for Northern District of Texas, 2014, p. 22).  
 
  Brown adopted a constantly shifting arsenal of descriptors that simultaneously linked him to the 
fourth estate (“journalist,” “former journalist,” “pseudo-journalist”) and Anonymous (“propagandist,” 
“informal spokesperson,” “strategist,” “theorist,” “operative,” “forward engineer,” “legal organizer”) a 
practice that recalls the mutable and performative construction of identity we term versioning, but that 
also illustrates a consistent strategic rationale. He used his public persona, journalistic credentials, and 
outsider status to carve a liminal space from which he could use the fruits of Anonymous hacks and 
operations for investigative purposes.  
 
Though prosecutors originally charged Brown with 10 counts of aggravated identity theft and two 
counts of credit card fraud for posting an HTTP link to leaked emails from Stratfor, these charges were 
eventually dropped when he pleaded guilty to the crimes of accessory, obstruction, and threatening a 
federal officer in exchange for a deal (U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas, 2012). It is 
unclear how successful the prosecution’s case could have been had Brown not threatened FBI Agent 
Robert Smith via a YouTube video, since he was always careful to point out that whatever his involvement 
with Anonymous, he did not hack. This is also illustrated by the fact that other journalists who had posted 
the same HTTP link were never charged and that throughout his trial Brown was under a gag order that 
prevented him from speaking to the media. 
 
In coming out, hacktivists attempt to govern their subjectivation by controlling their name and 
the time of its publicity. For Assange, subjectivation meant Wikileaks grew to prominence. In Snowden’s 
case it meant he could take responsibility for, and justify, his actions. Brown thought an identity as a 
journalist might give him constitutional cover. Each hoped to manage the public’s understanding of the 
motivations surrounding their actions so that debates concerning the political import of their disclosures 
and revelations remained focused on the content of the communication—and not tainted by the renegade 
identity of the messengers. In this sense, coming out is an effort toward dignity and, however futile, 
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Doxing 
 
The clearest example of the tensions posed by the networked and illicitly political self play out 
around the category of being discovered, revealed, outed, or doxed by criminal investigators, former 
collaborators, or police informants. Doxing refers to the exposure of personal and previously private 
information (e.g., home address, phone numbers, credit card numbers, pictures, financial records, etc.) 
about an individual online; it originates from “docs,” itself short for “documents.” Doxing is a popular 
hacktivist tactic deployed against a wide array of marks including law enforcement, corporate executives, 
and private security contractors. Doxers build dossiers about targets that are then released in various 
online locales (e.g., sites like Wikileaks, Pastebin, Doxbin on the Tor “dark net,” social media networks, 
and online forums) in an effort to embarrass and harass individuals or their organizations.  
 
Doxing has a leveling and flattening effect on power asymmetries: It targets and neutralizes the 
wall of privacy and anonymity that often characterizes the upper echelons of corporate industrial power 
and pierces the “faceless” and uniformed persona of its foot soldiers. For example, in response to a series 
of dawn law enforcement raids and covert activities against hacktivist groups Anonymous and LulzSec in 
2011, FBI agents were warned via the Anonymous-related Twitter account @OpMonsanto to expect the 
release of their personally identifiable information: “To any FBI agent involved in the continued unjust 
raiding of peaceful Anons: Expect us. You are no longer entitled to your privacy” (Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, 2011, p. 4).  
 
Anonymous followed up this missive a few days later by hacking more than 70 law enforcement 
websites and exfiltrating large amounts of confidential data, including email addresses, user names, social 
security numbers, home addresses, phone numbers, informant lists, active warrant information, and 
databases of jail inmates. This operation eventually involved the doxing of some 7,000 police personnel 
and led the FBI to issue an Intelligence Bulletin warning personnel to protect themselves against the high 
risk of identity theft and harassment caused by doxing (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2011).  
 
With the exception of self-outing, the default setting of hacktivist communities is anonymity, and 
it is rigorously pursued through operational security and versioning. Yet the notoriety of hacktivist 
operations, intrusions, and data dumps—as well as their increasingly political and destabilizing effect—has 
generated strong incentives for cyber-mercenaries, rival hackers, law enforcement personnel, and private 
security outfits to dox hacktivists.  
 
One well-documented example involves the private security firm HBGary Federal and its attempts 
to dox key members of Anonymous, map the organizational hierarchies of the group, and present the 
findings at the Bsides security conference in 2011 under the title, “Who Needs the NSA When We Have 
Social Media?” In advance of the presentation, the company’s CEO, Aaron Barr, claimed to have infiltrated 
Anonymous, discovering its command structure and the identities of its key members (Menn, 2011). The 
very day Menn’s Financial Times article broke, Anonymous hacked into HBGary Federal and its parent 
company’s websites, downloaded email spools, and deleted files and backups, as well as commandeering 
all of Barr’s social media accounts. Most of the company emails and documents were eventually posted on 
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the Pirate Bay and AnonLeaks, leading to a series of scandals and, after Barr’s resignation in February 
2011, HBGary Federal closed its doors (Coleman, 2014).  
 
Barr’s overall methodology of cross-referencing and correlating user information on IRC, 
Facebook, and other sites to draw connections between users, their relationships, and their activity is 
precisely the sort of information the FBI used to identify the hacktivist Jeremy Hammond. Hammond’s 
case illustrates the efficacy of these investigative online methodologies when combined with the off-line 
resources of federal law enforcement. Like many hacktivists, Hammond deployed a variety of online 
personas and nicknames in his exchanges on instant messaging, chat, and social media platforms. A 
central clue to Hammond’s real-life identity was obtained first through the deconstruction of his versioning 
(e.g., determining that Hammond was, in fact, “sup_g,” “yohoho,” “ghost,” etc.) and then the correlation 
of the biographical clues he had inadvertently provided through these different aliases.  
 
An influential member of Anonymous, Hector Xavier Montsegur (“Sabu”), was arrested by the FBI 
in June 2011 and subsequently informed on Hammond. From June onward, Sabu incited, helped plan, and 
executed a variety of notorious hacks while working for government authorities. As is evident in the 
numerous IRC chats the government introduced as evidence against Hammond, Sabu would attempt to 
link Hammond’s different online identities (Anderson, 2012). For example, in a chat log between Sabu and 
Hammond as “sup_g” where they discussed the fallout from the Stratfor hack, at a certain point Sabu 
stated, “If I get raided anarchaos your job is to cause havok in my honor.” “Anarchaos” was one of 
Hammond’s numerous identities, and Hammond’s reply of “it shall be so” drew a connection between the 
two personas (U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York, 2012, p. 22).  
 
At the same time, Sabu’s identity as the most militant and publicly outspoken member of Anon 
invited trust, so Hammond sometimes volunteered information. For example, in an IM conversation with 
Sabu in January 2012, Hammond, as “yohoho,” asks Sabu (as “leondavis”) to help him meet a member of 
the hacktivist outfit “cabincrew,” Sabu directs him to the cabincrew IRC channel and Hammond asks him 
to “invite sup_g” so he can enter the channel; moments later he corrects himself and asks that Sabu 
invite yet another alias, “an0n4g” (U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, 2014, Exhibit 
H, p. 8). At other times, as other personas, Hammond disclosed that he had served time in federal prison, 
had been arrested and detained at the 2004 Republican National Convention, and had done some time for 
marijuana possession, among other personally identifying information (U.S. Attorney’s Office for the 
Southern District of New York, 2012, pp. 26–29). 
 
The FBI used Sabu’s chat files (Sabu had been using a government issued laptop and was under 
24-hour surveillance) to isolate the kernels of biography and online activity Hammond disclosed and 
compare them to law enforcement records. Once they were reliably sure that Hammond was their target, 
FBI agents began surveillance, physically staking out his house on the Southside of Chicago and using a 
“pen register” device to reveal the Internet Protocol (IP) addresses of the sites he was visiting. As Figure 2 
illustrates, physical surveillance dovetailed with online surveillance as investigators used Sabu to check if 
Hammond’s arrival or departure from home correlated with the appearance or exit of one of his online 
personas.  
 
International Journal of Communication 10(2016)  Gagged and Doxed  13 
 
Source: Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2012 
 
Figure 2. March 1, 2012: FBI Surveillance of Hammond’s TOR Activity. 
 
 
Although the motivation and ultimate manifestation of doxing practices varies, one can identify 
two broad patterns. For hacktivists, doxing is an end in itself: The public exposure of individuals, 
organizational hierarchies, and intimate connections is a highly symbolic, overt act. In many respects, it 
causes the now-ubiquitous practices of surveillance and visibility to be diffused among the general public 
against its operators—or at least their symbolic proxies. In contrast, as a countertactic deployed by law 
enforcement and private security contractors, doxing is covert and serves as a means to an end. That goal 
might involve the development of a dossier on an individual or a group of hacktivists to use as a starting 
point for deeper and more intrusive surveillance that will eventually form the basis for an arrest (e.g., 
Jeremy Hammond) or as a final component in the effort to turn hacktivists into confidential informants 
(e.g., Sabu).  
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Doxed individuals are often informed on by a former colleague or confidant who has been turned 
into an informant by authorities. Search-and-arrest warrants may soon follow, drawing together more 
evidence and cataloging the connections between the virtual and off-line worlds. Whatever agency 





A gagging order is a legal injunction that suppresses public speech; it has been previously used 
to silence hackers like Kevin Mitnick (Mitnick, 2012). It may be implemented so that private or sensitive 
information does not become public in the course of a prosecution. Additionally, imprisonment, though 
imposed to punish and reform criminals, can also have a silencing effect on political speech. Besides 
restrictions and limitations surrounding prisoner correspondence, visiting and phone privileges, the 
“totalizing” character of prison regimes is designed to atomize and isolate. There have been some notable 
cases of hacktivists that managed to send a few tweets from behind bars with the aid of friends on the 
outside (e.g., Barrett Brown). But for prisoners whose cases carry strong subversive and political 
implications or hacktivists who can become spokespersons and martyrs for political causes, routine 
security constraints on communication can become de facto injunctions against it.  
 
Despite the scrupulous anonymity maintained by hacktivists, many are eventually unmasked, 
surveilled, and caught. They are often placed under court orders restricting what they can say in public 
and sentenced to lengthy prison sentences. Moreover, when they are released, they can only look forward 
to living a largely analog life. For example, in 2013, Jeremy Hammond was sentenced to a maximum of 10 
years in custody and another three years of supervised release. Throughout the trial he was under a court 
order that restricted what he could say in public, and although the government’s discovery materials 
involved three terabytes of documents, he was only able to view the material in the presence of his 
lawyers and could not use prison computers to do legal research—despite the fact that they are not 
connected to the Internet (Reitman, 2012). While in prison, he is allowed to use the nonprivate Federal 
Prison Email service (Trust Fund Limited Inmate Computer System [TRULINCS]) to keep in touch with 
authorized contacts. 
 
Upon release, Hammond will be subjected to a series of special supervision conditions for three 
years. These include a prohibition on involvement or contact with electronic civil disobedience websites or 
organizations, participation in the probation department’s computer/Internet-monitoring program, a 
complete ban on masking online identity, and a ban on the encryption of stored data and online 
communications (e.g., through TOR or proxy servers)—although these may be allowed if undertaken as 
part of legitimate employment (U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, 2014, p. 75). 
Further, Hammond’s computer and connected devices will need to be registered with the probation 
department and outfitted with surveillance applications that will monitor his activities.  
 
Similarly, throughout his trial, Barrett Brown was under a court-imposed gag order that 
prevented him from speaking with the media. He was sentenced to five years in prison and two years of 
supervised parole after he is released. The restrictions on Brown’s supervised release mirror Hammond’s: 
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He will have to enroll in the probation service’s computer- and Internet-monitoring program, pay for the 
costs of his monitoring, and comply with the installation of hardware and software that allow for “the 
evaluation of [his] computer use” (U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas, 2014, p. 318). He 
will also be required to submit to periodic and unannounced examinations of his computers and associated 
hardware as well as provide written authorization for the release of information from his Internet service 
provider. 
 
Prisons have always leveraged the contrast between inside and outside as a mechanism for 
institutional control (Irwin, 1985), but increasingly they also heighten and exaggerate the gap between 
the online and off-line. In this sense, a custodial sentence not only interrupts the acts of subjectivation 
and self-formation described in this article, it also forms the institutional harness through which dominant 
categories of individual ascription and identification are redeployed. In prison only one identity (conferred 
and guaranteed by the state) is recognized as valid and legitimate. Further, release from imprisonment 
under the special parole conditions described previously extends this targeted reinscription of identity into 
the community. Even though prohibitions and injunctions against the use of computers for convicted 
hackers have been meted out as conditions of release since the mid-1990s (e.g., for Chris Lamprecht, 
Kevin Mitnick, and Kevin Poulsen) (Thomas, 2003), these new, legally imposed bans on dissent, 
anonymity, and encryption associate digital activism and online civil disobedience with a presumption of 
criminal intent, thereby transforming subjectivation practices into technologies of subjugation. That is, 
they have been transformed into a set of techniques that reinforce and reify traditional mechanisms of 





An examination of the conviction of hacktivists reveals the performative practices of hacktivists 
(subjectivation) and the disciplinary practices of the state (subjection). Hacktivists and cyberlaw 
enforcement are in an uneasy relationship in which each co-creates the other. We have argued that this 
asymmetrical space of co-creation takes shape against the backdrop of a digital culture animated by 
amateur and voluntary practices of self-presentation (encapsulated by the term selfie) that have both 
emancipatory and constraining effects. In particular, we have highlighted the extent to which corporate 
systems of surveillance and state modes of subjugation are embedded and furthered through the practices 
of self-presentation and emancipation that are engendered by digital culture. 
 
In this article, we focused on hacktivists who infiltrate government and corporate servers. In 
pursuing them, investigators further develop their arts of cracking and identity versioning. It is a 
dialectical process. New generations of hackers develop new techniques in evasion and infiltration, and in 
response, a new criminal division lurches forward to investigate. This process evolves into the future, with 
the state, for the most part, dominating the eventual direction of the relationship (Fish & Follis, 2015). As 
investigations into hacktivist “know-how” and state counterstrategies, these explorations of networks and 
computers are epistemological pursuits involving technology, computer science, jurisprudence, and the 
flexible identities afforded by social media platforms. They illustrate the ‘‘quintessentially local, messy, 
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and contingent’’ (Wolgar, 2000, p. 168) process of knowledge coproduction and its “awkward, unequal, 
unstable” (Tsing, 2005, p. 4) character.  
 
As either activists for a more open society or unscrupulous users of technology, there is much to 
learn about identity and how the state evolves in response to the pursuit of hacktivists. We have focused 
on how identity is a multipurpose tool for both criminal investigators and hacktivists. Like whistleblowers, 
hacktivists are considered by some to be public servants, making corporations and politicians more 
transparent. Others see hacktivists as avant-garde techno-criminals, on the vanguard of cyber-insecurity. 
Whether one sees the practices of hacktivists as benevolent or illegal, one thing is certain: The future of 
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